Restoring faith in the flag state system of regulating safety in shipping is proving to be a long and slow process. It is 30 years since the first port state control (PSC) regime was established when a group of 14 European countries signed the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the wake of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill off the coast of northern France. The countries involved were, in effect, saying they no longer trusted flag states to fulfil the obligation to perform effective safety oversight and consequently would inspect ships calling at their ports and where necessary detain them.
The European example has been followed by regions around the world (most notably in the Asia-Pacific region where the Tokyo MoU was established in 1993) and, with the inclusion of the US which has its own national inspection regime, a virtually global PSC system now carries out thousands of vessel inspections a year, in addition to those performed by flags themselves and commercial interests such as charterers.
Key developments in PSC over the past three decades have been the adoption of the “name and shame” policy of publishing regular detention lists and the grading of flags in white, grey and black lists based on inspection and detention statistics.
The wealth of inspection and detention data, made public by the regimes individually or through the Equasis website, has also provided useful performance-measuring tools to the flags themselves and the recognised organisations (ROs) delegated by flags to carry out statutory surveys, as well as to ship operators and charterers.
One measure of the success of PSC might be in the fact that Liberia, the flag flown by the Amoco Cadiz, now regularly features on the main white lists. This and the presence of nearly all the other major open registers on the white lists has helped undermine claims that they were less safe than so-called traditional flags.
Being white-listed or, in the case of the US Coast Guard (USCG), enrolled in the Qualship21 programme, has come to be seen as a defining mark of quality and one eagerly marketed by flags seeking to stand out in a crowded market. Flying a white-list flag, a ship is less likely to be inspected, a fact that could influence a ship owner in choice of register.
As the PSC system has forced flags to improve their performance, the number achieving white-list status (43 on the Paris MoU’s current version) is increasing to the point where, however, inclusion has become less exclusive and the differentiation among flags less marked.
Last year, however, both the Paris MoU and the USCG decided to include a new factor in their risk-based ratings: the fact a flag had been audited by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
The Voluntary Member State Audit Scheme (VMSAS, but also known as VIMSAS) was set up by the IMO in 2005 and, by October this year, 68 flags had put themselves forward to be audited, with 57 having been through the process.
The audit is part of IMO’s response to the criticism of the flag state system that lead to the development of PSC and is aimed at finding out how member states can improve compliance, while helping the IMO itself find better ways of regulating shipping.
The benefits of voluntary auditing are already being seen, with those flags that have been through the process being rewarded for their commitment to raising standards. The Paris MoU now produces a separate and shorter list of low-risk flags whose registered ships are eligible for exemption from inspections. This whiter-than-white list has two criteria: inclusion on the main white list and evidence of an IMO audit.
The list of Qualship21 flags for 2012 is also shorter than in previous years, with only 18 qualifying; five others would have been included but for their failure to supply (due, perhaps, to time constraints) the required VMSAS information, although two of those did make the Paris MoU list.
Typical shortcomings revealed in the audits undertaken so far include a lack of co-ordination among the different government agencies that can often be involved in implementing IMO regulations; a lack of resources; a lack of training programmes; and the absence of documented procedures.
A survey of a random selection of reports (published by the flag states concerned themselves) also provides some idea of how complex and demanding the business of managing a flag and keeping it both up-to-date and fully compliant with IMO regulations has become.
The thoroughness of the audits and the attention to detail will no doubt have exposed flag administration staff, albeit on a less regular basis, to something akin to the experience ships’ crews face when they undergo a PSC inspection. Flag states will, like seafarers and company staff ashore, have also been made to appreciate the importance of having the right paperwork.
Flag state administrations, of course, are merely one and often minor part of overall government business and their ability to meet their IMO obligations can be constrained by the efficiency of the national legislative system.
Initially, PSC was seen as only a temporary measure in the belief that the flag state system could be restored to working order in reasonable time and in the hope that port states would not have to shoulder the burden of inspections for long, but the fact that ships, 30 years on, are still subject to PSC inspections is testimony to the challenge the IMO has faced in trying repair the flag state system.
Flag state audits are now set to become mandatory from 2014, although it is being left to the member states to decide whether to make the results public or not, a move that will no doubt disappoint those in favour of greater transparency in shipping.
With a limited number of auditors, it will take time to audit all 170 member states and it remains to be seen whether it will have the effect of restoring faith in the flag state system, leaving PSC to continue its work for at least the foreseeable future, but perhaps not for another 30 years.